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III Macroeconomic Management in APEC
Economies: The Response to Capital Inflows
Inrecent years, there has been a surge of internationalcapital flows to many Asian countries. During
1990-93, developing economies in Asia received a net
capital inflow of $151 billion, more than double the
amount recorded for the previous four years. For cer-
tain Asian countries, such as Malaysia and Thailand,
these inflows have amounted to as much as 15 percent
of GDP (Chart 3-1). These developments represent a
major turning point from the previous decade, when,
because of the debt crisis, little capital flowed to most
developing countries. This change is not limited to
only a few countries. The number of economies in Asia
experiencing a surge in capital inflows has recently
expanded; among the more recent recipients of capital
inflows are India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Other regions,
in particular, Latin America and the Middle East, have
also been attracting large amounts of foreign capital.
While issues pertaining to the management of interna-
tional debt dominated the policy discussions of the
1980s, the design of effective economic policies for
dealing with these capital inflows, and for ensuring
their durability, has become a key economic policy
issue in recent years.24
Capital inflows-or, more generally, access to inter-
national capital markets-are often regarded as central
to the development process. The historical experience
of many industrial countries has shown that external
financing helped facilitate investment and growth. The
recent Asian experience indicates a similar pattern, as
the surge in capital inflows has been accompanied by
sharp increases in investment in the recipient countries
(with investment/GDP ratios rising anywhere in the
range of 2-10 percent during the past five years) and
an acceleration in economic growth (Bercuson and
Koenig (1993)). At the same time, capital inflows, par-
ticularly of the magnitudes currently observed in many
Asian and Latin American countries, may pose serious
dilemmas for economic policy. Large capital inflows
are often associated with a rapid expansion of money
and credit, inflationary pressures, a real exchange rate
appreciation, and a deterioration in the current account
of the balance of payments. In addition, they tend to
24This issue is addressed in some detail in Calvo, Leiderman, and
Reinhart (1993 and 1994) and Schadler and others (1993).
have a substantial impact on the stock market, the real
estate market, and the money market-an impact that
may well threaten the stability of these markets and of
the financial system as a whole. Furthermore, if the
capital inflows are purely short term, these problems
intensify as the probability of an abrupt and sudden
reversal increases.
This section describes the current episode of capital
inflows to several Asian economies, summarizing the
principal facts, the impact of the inflows, and policy
options.25 The discussion also covers, when relevant,
the similar experiences of Latin American countries,
with an emphasis on the policy priorities that could
ensure the persistence and sustainability of these flows,
as far as possible. The analysis draws heavily on previ-
ous work by Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart (1993,
1994, and forthcoming, 1995), who used data for ten
LatinAmerican countries and eight Asian countries, as
well as other recent studies undertaken in the IMF
(Goldstein and Mussa (1993), International Monetary
Fund (1992 and 1993), and Schadler and others
(1993)). The first part of this section describes the
main characteristics and macroeconomic consequences
of capital inflows to the Asian region. The second part
discusses the role of external factors in the present
inflows episode, as well as the likely factors that will
determine the sustainability of these capital inflows.
Finally, the relative merits of various policy responses
to the surge in capital inflows are discussed.
Capital inflows are defined as the increase in net
international indebtedness of the private and the public
sectors and are measured-albeit imprecisely-by the
surplus in the capital account of the balance of pay-
ments. Therefore, except for errors and omissions, the
capital account surplus equals the excess of expendi-
ture over income (which, in turn, is equal to the gap
between national investment and national saving) plus
the change in official holdings of international
2SThe discussion covers all Asian countries as well as selected
ones that are members of APEC.
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. Capital Inflows
j Balance of Goods, Balance on Capital
'1.. j Services, and Account Plus Net Changes in
I Year Private Transfers' Errors and Omissions I Reserves
2
-;-1 1985 -16.6 19.5 -2.9.'::'
;I~
1986 0.9 22.7 -23.5
~~ 1987 17.9 23.3
-41.3
1988 5.7 5.9 -11.6
1989 -2.6 12.3 -9.6
....> 1990 -5.8 29.2 -23.5
1991 -4.7 46.3 -41.5
1992 -8.2 30.1 -21.9
1993 -24.0 45.0 -21.0
Source: IMF. World fronomic Outlook (various issues).
IA minus sign indicates a deficit in the pertinent account. The balance on goods, services, and private transfers is equal to the current account balance
less official transfers. The latter are treated in this table as external financing and are included in the capital account.
f:. 2A minus sign indicates an increase .
.~i.~~..:C:~·:~'rL·;';:t'i -k:$;.k't'. ~.~ f"- ~.•., .,,~:~"':_:-:~.( ~~-..; '.~,~~. ·~7.?"0~",· .....£.~l:~'.
reserves. Thus, increases in capital inflows can be iden-
tified with larger current account deficits and/or an
accumulation of reserves.
The central bank of the recipient economy can react
to increased ca~)ital inflows in various ways, depending
mainly on the;'revailing exchange rate regime. Under
a pure float, th(~increased net exports of assets in the
capital account finance an increase in net imports of
goods and services. In this case, the authorities do not
intervene in the foreign exchange market, and the
inflows of capital from abroad are not associated with
changes in central banks' holdings of official reserves.
At the other extreme, the domestic authorities can
actively intervene to maintain a fixed exchange rate. In
the presence of a capital inflow, they would purchase
the foreign exchange that flows in, and the increase in
the capital account surplus would be associated with an
increase in official reserves.
Characteristics of the Inflows
Capital began to flow to Thailand in 1988 and to a
number of other Asian developing economies in
1989-90 (see Bercuson and Koenig (1993) and Chuhan,
Claessens and Mamingi (1993)).26 Table 3-1 presents a
breakdown of Asia's balance of payments into its three
26There are, however. important differences in the orders of mag-
nitudes of the capital inflows among the five Asian countries consid-
ered. For instance, despite a substantial rise in 1992-93, capital
inflows and investment have been lower in the Philippines than in its
neighbors.
main accounts.27 The capital inflows under considera-
tion appear in the form of surpluses in the capital
account of about $29 billion in 1990, about $46 billion
in 1991, $30 billion in 1992, and $45 billion in 1993.
As far as composition is concerned, the capital that
has flowed to developing countries in the 1990s is radi-
cally different from that of the earlier episodes, with
commercial bank loans, which dominated the earlier
periods, substantially replaced by foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) and bond and equity portfolio flows (see
Chart 3-2). It is evident from the data for Asia that an
important part of the rise in capital inflows is due to
marked increases in FDI, particularly in the early stages
of the current episode (Table 3-2). It is well known that
FDI is guided more by medium- or long-term prof-
itability considerations than by portfolio investments
and hence is probably subject to a smaller degree of
sudden reversals than are portfolio flows. Moreover,
FDI flows have positive externalities for the recipient
economy, such as increased access to foreign markets
and increased scope for human capital development and
for introduction of top-of-the-line technology. Thus far,
the investment flows have been directed mainly to ser-
vice sectors such as transportation, telecommunica-
tions, and banking. Among the countries, FDI has been
of greatest importance-relative to total capital
inflows-in Malaysia and perhaps Thailand.28
27The regional breakdown of developing countries corresponds to
the classification used in the IMF's World Economic Outlook.
28Thailand's data on the composition of capital flows tend to
understate foreign direct investment.
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More recently, portfolio flows to countries in the
region have risen dramatically almost across the board
as bond and equity portfolios in many of the industrial
countries have become more internationally diversi-
fied, gaining greater exposure to these countries (see
Gooptu (1993)).29 The growing demand for the equities
and bonds of these countries by institutional and private
investors in the United States, Japan, and other industri-
al countries has encouraged and facilitated a surge in
bond and equity finance. As Table 3-3 shows, bond
issuance nearly quadrupled between 1989 and 1992
and continued to soar during 1993. The trend in equity
issuance is similar, although there are signs that the
pace slowed somewhat for some countries during 1993.
Direct equity portfolio purchases on local stock mar-
kets, especially by institutional investors, have become
the most important channel for equity inflows into vari-
ous emerging market economies and have fueled stock
market booms (Chart 3-3). In recent years, total returns
in Asian and other emerging stock markets have been
considerably higher than in the United States and other
industrial countries; during 1993, total stock market
returns in U.S. dollars were 117 percent in Indonesia,
22 percent in Korea, 111 percent in Malaysia, 154 per-
cent in the Philippines, and 114 percent in Thailand.
International investors have clearly viewed Asia as fer-
tile ground for raising their expected returns.
29For a few of the countries in the region, as well as for most Latin
American countries, part of the surge in capital inflows is undoubt-
edly due to the repatriation of flight capital. In part, this return has
been encouraged by a series of policy measures designed to reverse
capital flight-such as amnesties, capital account liberalization, and
introduction of domestic instruments denominated in foreign curren-
cy (see International Monetary Fund (1992) and Mathieson and
Rojas-Suarez (1993».
Table 3-2. Foreign Direct Investment for Selected Asian Countries
<'" percent of GDP) .'0 ..': ' •••• ,Co , /,.'.,.",.
_ -. Capital Inflows -
-J
,~lInternational bond issues
China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Korea
Taiwan Province of China
Thailand
1991 1992
115 359
100 185
369 493
2,012 3,208
160 60
17 610
II 1,049
140 1,250
167 262
200 ISO
382
159 392
125 272
543
209 145
64
613
72
466 -;
,-) International equity issues
-j China
Hong Kong
Indonesia
Korea
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Taiwan Province of China
Thailand
3,048
657
485
954
1,293
105
1,105 5,864
79
2,247
1,908
1,264
604
328
A substantial proportion of the inflows has been
channeled to reserves, which have increased by about
$85 billion in the last four years. At the end of 1993,
the stock of reserves for the Asian region stood at about
$261 billion, well in excess of the combined stock of
reserves of all developing countries (including
economies in transition) outside the region. Overall,
the sharp increase in official reserves indicates that in
the face of the capital inflows, the monetary authorities
in the region intervened quite heavily in the foreign
exchange market to keep nominal exchange rates from
appreciating significantly. Chart 3-4, which depicts
monthly data on international reserves for a selected
group of countries, confirms that all of the countries
considered have experienced a pronounced upward
trend in the stock of official reserves in recent years.
However, the pace of accumulation of the reserves out
of a given capital inflow is recently showing some
signs of slowing (see Table 3-1). In part, this develop-
ment may reflect the mounting opportunity costs asso-
ciated with holding a large and rising stock of low-
yield official foreign securities, particularly when
interest rates on existing external and domestic debt are
substantially higher. In part, the slower pace of reserve
accumulation may also be due to the monetary authori-
ties' greater willingness to accept a more appreciated
nominal exchange rate as the inflows continue.
The rest of the capital inflows helped to finance a
marked increase in the region's current account
deficit-that is, an increased gap between national
investment and national saving. As noted earlier, an
important part of the inflows has financed increa:;r;s in
private investment. Since 1987, according to the ~()rld
Economic Outlook (International Monetary Fund (vari-
ous issues)), ratios of investment to GDP have risen by
6 percentage points in Korea, by 10 percentage points
in Malaysia, by 5 percentage points in the Philippines,
and by 7 percentage points in Thailand. The high and
rising investment ratios, it is often noted, bode well for
the growth prospects of the region and the countries'
ability to service its debt.
Macroeconomic Effects
It is useful to compare the macroeconomic effects of
capital inflows to Asia with the Latin American experi-
ence and focus on a broader set of countries. The main
similarities between the two regions can be summa-
rized as follows: First, as Table 3-4 illustrates, the
swing in the balance on the capital account (as a per-
centage of GDP) is of a siffiilar magnitude for the sam-
ple countries in the two regions. For the Latin Ameri-
can countries, the change in the capital account
amounts to 4 percent of GDP; for the Asian countries,
the capital account surplus increases by 2.7 percent of
GDP. Second, as discussed, capital inflows in both
regions have been associated with a marked accumula-
tion of international reserves, indicating a heavy degree
I
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Capital Account' Direct Investment Investment Public Consumption
1 1984-89 1990-93 1984-89 1990-93 1984-89 1990-93 1984-89 1990-93 'j
Latin America ,
~ Argentina -2.2 2.5 0.7
1.4 18.8 15.2 13.7 7.5
~.
Bolivia 2.2 5.1 0.5 1.2 10.1 13.5 11.2 11.6 ~
Brazil -2.3 -{).4 0.5 0.2 17.1 15.3 11.1 12.1 '!
1 Chile -3.0 5.9 0.7 1.9 15.8 19.5 10.9 8.8 ':-;i1I
..~~ Colombia 1.7 0.7 1.5 1.5 16.0 14.6 9.2 10.1
Ecuador -7.2 -3.7 0.5 1.4 19.2 18.8 11.6 7.8
I
j Mexico -{).4 6.1 0.8 1.6 16.8 20.6 11.5 10.3
~i Peru -6.5 0.7 0.3 20.0 22.9 9.8
11.1
Uruguay -2.9 -{).7 9.9 11.8 14.4 9.1 .j'. Venezuela -2.9 -{).2 0.1 1.6 16.5 11.8 10.4 14.2 d
·1
Average of ten countries -2.4 1.6 0.5 1.1 16.0 16.4 11.4 10.2 .,
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25.9
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19.3
21.8
0.9
-2.6
0.4
-3.7
8.1
5.0
0.1
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6.7
1.6
10.1
1.4
-6.3
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Public Consumption ·,(;1
1984-88 1989-93
0.5
0.3
2.7
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36.0 9.8 9.8 133.7 16.0 14.4 {
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of foreign exchange market intervention by the mone-
tary authorities (Table 3-5). Third, the surge in capital
inflows (particularly portfolio flows) has been accom-
panied by sharp increases in stock prices and, more
generally, asset prices.30 Share price indices in U.S.
dollar terms for selected Latin American and Asian
emerging markets were higher at the end of 1993 than
at the time of renewal of capital inflows to these
regions (Chart 3-3). Fourth, capital inflows have been
accompanied by an acceleration in economic growth.
Finally, reflecting in part the broad trend toward capital
market liberalization and the greater sophistication of
JOLand prices have also posted strong increases in several coun-
tries; for a discussion of the case of Korea see Park and Park (forth-
coming, 1995) .
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domestic private enterprises, private bond and equity
financing has played an increasingly important role.
But there are also important differences between the
two regions. As discussed in Calvo, Leiderman, and
Reinhart (1994 and forthcoming, 1995), in most Latin
American countries capital inflows have been associat-
ed with considerable real exchange rate appreciation;
yet as Chart 3-5 il1ustrates, in Asia such an apprecia-
tion is less common.31 Although various reasons
account for the variations in the response of the real
exchange rate, important differences in the compos i-
31For example, based on data from the IMF Information Notice
System, the real exchange rates for Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay
appreciated by 169 percent, 35 percent, and 47 percent, respectively,
during January 1990-October 1993. Of course, the appreciation of
the real exchange rate can be a result of many factors.
~ ~ ...•
. _ External F=actors and Sustainability Issues
Changes in
Reserves2Year
1985 -5.5 6.5
1986 -19.9 12.9
1987 -12.9 16.2
1988 -13.5 5.7
1989 -10.3 12.6
1990 -7.7 23.3
1991 -21.0 39.2
1992 -36.3 59.4
1993 -39.7 44.3
-1.0
7.0
-3.2
7.9
-2.3
-15.7
-18.2
-23.1
-4.5
~.~
J
:1
Source: IMF. World Economic Outlook (various issues). A
IA minus sign indicates a deficit in the pertinent account. Balance on goods. services. and private transfers is equal to the current account balance less ' "
official transfers. The latter are treated in this table as external financing and are included in the capital account. ';;':1
':\'.{ 2A minus sign indicates an increase. ~!1
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tion of aggregate demand may playa key role in deter-
mining whether the real exchange rate appreciates or
not. As Table 3-4 summarizes, for the Asian countries,
investment as a share of GDP increased by about
3V2 percentage points during the capital inflows period,
but the investment ratio remained stagnant for the Latin
American region. There are, however, marked differ-
ences among the Latin American countries. For exam-
ple, both Chile and Mexico posted increases in invest-
ment during 1990-93. More recently, there are signs
that investment has also been rising in Argentina,
Colombia, and Peru. However, for the Latin American
region, the inflows-particularly in 1990-91 during
the initial stages of the surge-are primarily associated
with a decline in private saving and higher consump-
tion.32 If the increased investment (in Asia) is tilted
more toward imported capital goods and the increased
consumption (in Latin America) has an imported
domestic component, other things being equal, the real
exchange rate appreciation in Latin America would
tend to be stronger. In addition, differences in the
domestic policy response are likely to playa key role
in explaining the differences in real exchange rate
behavior in the two regions. Specifically, the behavior
of public sector consumption influences the real
exchange rate by affecting both the level and composi-
tion of aggregate demand (Table 3-4). Other things
being equal, the more restrained the fiscal stance at the
32Yery disparate initial conditions in excess capacity between the
two regions may help explain why investment surged in Asia and
not in Latin America. Most Asian countries entered the capital
inflow episode closer to full capacity utilization than their Latin
American counterparts (an exception is Chile), where growth had
been sluggish.
time of capital inflows, the weaker the real exchange
rate appreciation. Although several Latin American
countries (notably, Chile and Mexico) have had major
fiscal adjustment programs, these predated the surge in
capital inflows. By contrast, there were fiscal spending
contractions in several Asian economies, most marked-
ly in Thailand during 1988-91, at the time of the
inflows (see Schadler and others (1993)). In addition,
comparatively effective sterilization of capital inflows
in Asia-which was successful in limiting the expan-
sion in credit and money aggregates and in aggregate
demand-may have contributed to the differences in
real exchange rate behavior.
External Factors and Sustainability
Issues
To determine the main causes of the resurgence of
capital inflows to many developing countries in Asia
and elsewhere, it is important to distinguish between
the external and internal factors that gave rise to this
development. External factors are those that are
beyond the control of a given country and are thus
unrelated to policies the country follows. Examples of
such factors for small open economies are a decline in
world interest rates and recession in the rest of the
world, both of which may be accompanied by reduced
profit opportunities in the industrial countries. A simi-
lar effect would arise from regulatory changes that pro-
vide incentives for further international diversification
of investment portfolios at main financial centers.
Some of these external factors are likely to have an
important cyclical, or reversible, component. Internal
•
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factors, on the other hand, are most often related to
domestic policy. For example, countries can attract
long-term capital inflows (possibly in the form of
direct investment) by successfully implementing an
inflation stabilization program; introducing major
institutional reforms, such as the liberalization of the
domestic capital market and the opening of the trade
account; and instituting policies that result in credible
increases in the rate of return on investment (such as
tax credits). But domestic policies may also attract
short-term, reversible capital, especially when these
policies are not fully credible. Thus, partial credibility
about inflation stabilization or trade liberalization pro-
grams can result in relatively high returns on short-
term investments in view of the probability that these
programs will collapse. Foreign investors could obtain
relatively high profits under these circumstances if they
managed to reverse their original inflows after they
produced high yields and before the collapse of these
policy programs.
Causes of the Inflows
Several events and underlying trends interacted in
the late 1980s to make Asia potentially attractive for the
renewal of capital inflows from abroad. First, there was
a steep acceleration in the trends of institutionalization,
globalization, and international diversification of
investments in North America and other financial cen-
ters (see El-Erian (1992) for a discussion of key regula-
tory changes). This transformation is seen in the
increasing amounts of funds being managed by mutual
funds, pension funds, and life insurance companies.
These entities began trying to raise expected returns
and/or reduce overall risks by taking advantage of
investments in emerging markets. Because the total
assets of institutional investors are very large, even rel-
,Hively small portfolio shifts that increase the weight
attached to emerging markets can represent sizable
capital inflows for the recipients.33 In addition, regula-
tory changes in the United States have made it easier
for foreign private issuers of equity to place their issues
under conditions that are more attractive to investors.
Second, several countries in Asia made significant
progress toward improving relations with existing
external creditors and reducing concerns about debt
servicing. Third, and perhaps most important for long-
term investment, several countries adopted sound mon-
etary and fiscal policies, as well as market-oriented
structural reforms that have included liberalizing trade,
deregulating domestic financial markets, and eliminat-
ing capital account barriers. Fourth, and of the least
importance to Asian countries, especially when com-
pared with Latin America, repatriation of flight capital
33For example. it is estimated that the assets of pension funds and
life and casualty insurance companies reached 55.6 trillion in 1992.
facilitated the re-entry of capital to the region. Last, the
relocation of labor-intensive industries from Japan,
Korea, and Taiwan Province of China has played a key
role in attracting capital flows to Southeast Asia (see
Bercuson and Koenig (1993)). All these underlying fac-
tors helped re-establish credibility with foreign
investors and provided the necessary conditions for the
potential return of external capital to the region. Among
the key external factors behind the current episode of
capital inflows are the unusually low interest rates that
have prevailed in the United States and Japan for the
last four years. These low rates, combined with the per-
sistent recessions in most industrial countries (which
have also depressed returns in real estate and equity
markets), have attracted investors to the high-invest-
ment yields and improving economic prospects of
developing economies, such as those in Asia and Latin
America. As shown by Fernandez-Arias (1993), low
world interest rates have also improved creditworthi-
ness indicators for various developing countries, espe-
cially those with considerable debt-service obligations.
For the Asian experience, Chuhan, Claessens, and
Mamingi (1993) indicate that, while foreign influences
played a significant role in stimulating bond and equity
flows to several Asian countries, external develop-
ments were much less important than domestic ones in
that region, accounting for about one- third of bond and
equity flows to Asia. However, as the composition of
capital inflows to Asia shifts more toward portfolio
investment and proportionally less is accounted for by
FDI, the sensitivity of flows to external financial vari-
ables may well increase .
. Available empirical evidence for Latin American
countries indicates that foreign developments have
played a somewhat greater role in the most recent
episode, accounting, according to Calvo, Leiderman,
and Reinhart (1993), for 30-60 percent of the variance
in real exchange rates and reserves. Similarly, Chuhan,
Claessens, and Mamingi (1993) find that external fac-
tors explain about half of the bond and equity flows
from the United States to a group of six Latin Ameri-
can countries.
The emphasis on external factors does not imply that
domestic factors, such as structural reforms and stabi-
lization, have played a negligible role. As discussed
above, domestic policies have been essential for the re-
entry of international capital. However, domestic fac-
tors alone cannot explain why capital inflows have also
occurred in countries that have not undertaken reforms
and have not stabilized, or why they did not occur in
countries where reforms were introduced well before
1990.
Sustainability of the Capital Inflows
A critical question in most of the countries that
experienced a surge in capital inflows is: To what
•
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extent will external and internal developments combine
to make the flows endure? Part of the answer to this
question depends on the continuation of underlying
trends in the international financial system-that is, the
globalization of markets and the diversification of
investment portfolios. The growing interest of institu-
tional investors in Asia (and other emerging markets)
could continue throughout the rest of the 1990s in the
form of a large portfolio shift. The movement of inter-
national capital into emerging markets has been based
not only on high expected returns, but also on the idea
that diversification can reduce overall risk in portfo-
lios. The result is that Asian and Latin American secu-
rities are increasingly sold in the United States and
other markets. Over time, individual countries have
been able to rely less on returning flight capital and
have achieved a broader investor base. Cementing
these portfolio trends is a step in the direction of
regional trade agreements.
Nevertheless, other factors work in the opposite
direction. In particular, the prevailing global environ-
ment of low interest rates and weak activity in the
industrial countries will change. As the global econo-
my recovers, international interest rates may increase
and capital market conditions may tighten. The tight-
ening of monetary policy in the United States in Febru-
ary 1994 may be an early signal of that change. Fur-
thermore, new competitors are likely to emerge as
economic and political conditions in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union and other parts of the
world improve. Such developments raise the possibili-
ty of reversals-especially in markets characterized by
bubbles and in countries where the inflows are mostly
short term.34 In the face of heavy sales of domestic
securities by foreign investors, the liquidity of financial
markets in various countries would be put to a difficult
test.
Sustainability and durability also depend on internal
conditions. Sound macroeconomic policies, a strong
commitment to market-oriented reforms, and outward-
oriented trade strategies are likely to enhance the credi-
bility of a country's policymakers from the standpoint
of international investors. Economically, countries
make the most efficient use of capital inflows if the
investment return on these resources is higher than
their cost. Policies that promote high domestic saving
and adequate returns on domestic investment would be
beneficial in this context. As noted earlier, in some
countries, the financial intermediation of capital
inflows is a source of concern. For the individual
investor, the possibilities for hedging against these
risks are limited in developing countries. Under these
conditions, it is necessary to ensure adequate regula-
tion and supervision of the-banking system to avoid
34Many emerging markets. including several in Asia. have wit-
nessed historic highs in price-earnings ratios.
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currency or term-structure mismatches and excessive
credit creation, which could damage the ability of the
financial system to deal with a reversal of capital
flows.
The appropriate policy response to capital inflows
clearly depends on the composition of the inflows (that
is, whether they are short or long term), the availability
and flexibility of various policy instruments, and the
nature of domestic financial markets.35 In addition, the
prevailing policy environment and the extent of policy-
makers' credibility are key determinants of the form
and timing of the appropriate policy response.
The rationale for policy intervention emerges from
concerns that capital inflows can lead to inflationary
pressures, real exchange rate appreciation and loss of
competitiveness, and a deterioration of the current
account. In addition, the inflows can destabilize
domestic financial markets. These concerns have often
led the authorities to react to the capital inflows by
implementing a variety of policy measures. The role
and relative merits of some of those policies are exam-
ined below.
Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy
Most of the recipient countries have implemented
monetary and exchange rate policies in response to the
shifting patterns of international capital flows. Howev-
er, the policies have been quite varied.
Greater Exchange Rate Flexibility
A country that experiences a capital inflow may opt
to let the nominal exchange rate appreciate. This
option has three main virtues. First, it insulates the
money supply, domestic credit, and more generally, the
banking system from the inflows; this is particularly
desirable if the inflows are perceived to be reversible.
Second, because of a pass-through from the exchange
rate to domestic prices, it may help reduce inflation-
precisely at a time when achieving price stability is
high on the policymakers' agenda. Third, allowing the
exchange rate to fluctuate introduces uncertainty,
which may well discourage some of the purely specu-
lative (and highly reversible) inflows. The main disad-
vantage of a pure float is that massive capital inflows
may induce a steep nominal and real appreciation of
the domestic currency, which, in turn, may damage
strategic sectors of the economy, like nontraditional
35Unfortunately. the policy choice is often complicated by data
that do not reliably differentiate between short-term and long-term
inflows.
. Policy Response
exports. Damage would be inevitable if the real appre-
ciation were to persist. But, even if the appreciation did
not persist, the greater real exchange rate volatility
could have negative effects on tradable goods sectors
(see, for instance, Grobar (1993)) to the extent that
financial markets do not provide enough instruments to
hedge against such uncertainty.
There have been wide differences among countries
in the degree of exchange rate flexibility in the present
episode. However, the common ground appears to be
that all central banks intervene in the foreign exchange
market to some degree and that no country has operat-
ed under a free float. Among the Latin American coun-
tries, Chile and Mexico have allowed some degree of
exchange rate flexibility in the context of their
exchange rate bands. In Chile especially, the exchange
rate has been allowed to fluctuate extensively within
the band. (For various aspects of exchange rate bands
in Chile and Mexico, see Helpman, Leiderman, and
Bufman (1994)). Among the Asian countries, Korea
intends to further widen the margins for daily exchange
rate fluctuations, with the aim of moving toward a free
float in two to three years.36 Other countries, such as
Colombia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan Province
of China, have allowed for some appreciation of the
nominal exchange rate. As indicated, one advantage of
allowing nominal exchange rate appreciation is that to
the extent that market fundamentals call for a real
exchange rate appreciation, the latter can be effected
all at once through the nominal appreciation of the
exchange rate rather than gradually through increases
in domestic inflation.
Sterilized Versus Nonsterilized Intervention
Once the decision is made to intervene in the foreign
exchange market, the next policy question is whether
intervention should be sterilized. Sterilization-
the exchange of domestic securities for foreign
exchange-can help attenuate the impact of capital
inflows on money and credit. Sterilized intervention is
essentially an attempt to insulate the domestic economy
from the macroeconomic effects of capital inflows.
Curtailing the growth of the monetary aggregates may
be desirable for a variety of reasons: as the availability
of credit increases, the quality of the loans made may
well decline, placing the banking system at higher risk;
a too-rapid expansion may cause the economy to "over-
heat" and fuel inflationary pressures; if the monetary
authorities have announced monetary targets, growth in
excess of those targets may damage their credibility.
However, at a minimum, sterilized intervention will
keep domestic interest rates higher than they would
36During 1991-92. Korea's exchange rate policy was character-
ized by significant exchange rate intervention in response to capital
inflows.
have been in the absence of sterilization. At worst, this
measure may well raise domestic interest rates and pro-
vide incentives for further short-term inflows-as
occurred in Colombia in 1991 and Malaysia in
1991-92. In addition, sterilization results in an increase
in the public debt and entails quasi-fiscal costs to the
extent that the interest rate on domestic bonds is higher
than that on foreign exchange reserves. Estimates of
these costs in Latin American countries range from
0.25 percent to 0.50 percent of GDP a year (Kiguel and
Leiderman (1993)). The cross-country evidence reveals
that sterilized intervention (in varying orders of magni-
tude) has been the most common policy response to
capital inflows in both Asia and Latin America.
Nonsterilized intervention may be desirable if the
demand for money is perceived to increase owing, for
example, to a successful inflation stabilization pro-
gram that the authorities wish to accommodate. Under
those circumstances, rapid monetary growth is not
necessarily inflationary, and no quasi-fiscal burdens
are generated. However, nonsterilized intervention, as
noted, runs the risk of increasing the vulnerability of
the financial system, especially if there is a system of
explicit or implicit deposit insurance and banking
supervision is poor. It is important to note that in many
Asian countries the domestic banks are losing their
"preferred" corporate clients, who are finding it more
attractive to tap the international bond and equity mar-
kets directly. From an overall macroeconomic per-
spective, nonsterilized intervention is a more attractive
option for a banking system with less capability or
willingness to increase loans to the private sector, par-
ticularly for consumption purposes.37 When the bank-
ing system is unable to intermediate more funds, addi-
tional capital inflows through the banking system will
exert a strong downward pressure on interest rates,
slowing the pace of inflows and lowering the fiscal
cost of the outstanding domestic credit. However,
most of the countries considered are not currently in
this situation.
Reserve Requirements
A viable policy option that limits the expansion of
money and credit associated with the surge in capital
inflows is to increase bank reserve requirements and
curtail access to rediscount facilities. This option
would be especially relevant in those countries where
capital inflows have taken the form of substantial
increases in local bank accounts. Increasing marginal
reserve requirements-an option exercised by Chile
and Malaysia-dearly lowers banks' capacity to lend,
thus diminishing some of the risks associated with
37Malaysia, for instance. has attempted to curb consumer credit by
imposing restrictions on loans for purchases of motor vehicles and
adopting stricter guidelines on the issuance of credit cards.
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nonsterilized intervention without incurring quasi-fis-
cal costs. A drawback of this reserve requirement poli-
cy is that it is a onetime measure, and it may ultimately
promote disintermediation, as new institutions may
develop so as to bypass the regulations. Eventually,
these institutions could grow until they are considered
too large to fail and end up under the insurance umbrel-
la of the central bank, re-creating all the potential prob-
lems associated with nonsterilized intervention. There-
fore, increasing marginal reserve requirements is
unlikely to be effective beyond the short run. More-
over, increasing bank reserve requirements amounts to
a reversal of the underlying trend of financial liberal-
ization that has been occurring in developing countries,
under which these requirements have recently been
sharply reduced toward the levels observed in industri-
al countries.
Banking Regulation and Supervision
A major concern about the intermediation of inter-
national capital flows through the domestic banking
system is that individual banks are subject to free or
subsidized deposit insurance. In other words, there is
an implicit commitment by the authorities that banks-
especially the large ones-will not be allowed to fail. It
is well known that free implicit deposit insurance
induces banks to increase their risk exposure. In sever-
al Latin American countries, there has been a sharp
expansion of bank loans to finance private consump- -
tion. There is evidence that in some of these countries
the percentage of nonperforming loans has recently
increased over time. In addition, banks may pay little
attention to matching the maturities of deposits against
those for loans-the former being typically shorter
than the latter. Similarly, there could be a mismatch
between the currency denomination of bank loans and
the currency denomination of profits and incomes of
the _borrowing sector, for example, if a producer of a
nontradable good borrows in U.S. dollars. All these
factors increase the vulnerability of the financial sys-
tem to reversals in capital flows-reversals that have
the potential to end in financial crisis.
Effective bank regulation and supervision can
diminish some of these risks. As discussed earlier
attempting to insulate the banking system from short~
term capital flows is a particularly important goal in
cases where the inflows are predominantly in the form
of short-term bank deposits. Regulations that limit
banks' exposure ,'-' the volatility in equity and real
estate markets could help insulate the banking system
~ro~ the potential bubbles associated with sizable cap-
Ital Inflows. In this vein, risk-based capital require-
ments in conjunction with adequate banking supervi-
sion to ensure such requirements are complied with
could help insulate the domestic banking system from
the vagaries of capital flows.
•
Fiscal Policy
Some countries have complemented monetary and
exchange rate policies with fiscal measures, such as the
taxation of capital inflows ancllor a reduction in public
expenditure.
Taxing Short-Term Inflows
. Taxes on short-term borrowing abroad were imposed
In some countries-Israel in 1978 and Chile in 1991.
This policy conveys the powerful message that the
authoriti~s a:e concerned with short-term, potentially
speculatIVe Inflows. Such policies can coexist with
poli~ies that encourage a different type of inflow,
speCIfically foreign direct investment. Unlike other
measures, such taxes attack the problem at the source.
However, although they can be effective in the short
run, experience shows that the private sector is quick to
find ways to circumvent the taxes through over- and
underinvoicing of imports and exports and increased
reliance on parallel financial and foreign exchange
markets. Further, initial conditions are not always con-
ducive to a policy that adds barriers to international
capital movements. If a country has recently undertak-
en an adjustment program and the authorities enjoy
less-than-full credibility, imposing a capital account
barrier may be interpreted as signaling a policy rever-
sal and may thus undermine the success of the
pr,?gram.
Fiscal Tightening
Another policy reaction to capital inflows has been
to ~igh~en fis.cal policy; the clearest example of this
pohcy ISThaIland during 1988-91. The idea is to use
fiscal restraint, especially in the form of spending cuts
on nontradables, so as to lower aggregate demand and
curb the inflationary impact of capital inflows.38 Lower
g?vernment expenditure on nontraded goods and ser-
VIC~Sc?uld have a direct impact on aggregate demand,
whIch IS unlikely to be offset by an expansion of pri-
vate sector demand. However, contraction of govern-
ment expenditure is always a sensitive political issue
and cann~t be undertaken on short notice. Delaying fis-
cal res~aI~t, howev~r, increases the risk that, ex post,
the pohcy ISprocychcal. Moreover, fiscal policy is usu-
ally set on the basis of medium- or Iona-term consider-. 0
atlOns rather than in response to what may turn out to
be short-t~rm f1uctuat!ons in international capital
flows. ThaIland exemphfies this policy dilemma. The
combination of booming growth and the substantive
fiscal restraint of the past few years has generated a
38In addition. to the extent that it reduces the aovemment's -need to
issue debt. a tighter fiscal stance is also likel; to lower domestic
Interest rates .
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perceived need to improve the current infrastructure,
which is no longer adequate if rapid growth is to be
sustained. At the same time, the pressures on the real
exchange rate that accompany the surge in inflows
would warrant fiscal restraint. However, in cases where
the authorities had envisioned tightening the fiscal
stance, a surge in capital inflows may call for earlier
and, perhaps, more aggressive action.
Various countries have adopted structural measures
to indirectly or directly diminish the size, or the poten-
tial adverse effects, of capital inflows. Several of the
Asian and Latin American countries have either under-
taken or are considering undertaking capital account
liberalization. For instance, in 1993 Thailand removed
most of the controls on capital outflows, while Chile
adopted similar, but more modest, measures in March
1994. These countries have followed the general prin-
ciple that allowing domestic agents to hold foreign
assets generates some offsetting capital outflow fol-
lowing the liberalization. However, the net impact of
these measures on the capital account is not yet condu-
sive. In some cases, as the recent experience of Colom-
bia highlights, the liberalization measures increased
the confidence of foreign investors and, in so doing,
further stimulated inflows.
In some cases, the presence of capital inflows and
the stronger economic activity were used to ;mple-
ment trade liberalization and domestic fiTiancial
reforms more rapidly. In principle, the surges in capi-
tal inflows present countries with a good opportunity
to liberalize trade, which would tend to dampen the
impact of the capital inflows on the exchange rate.
Colombia, Indonesia, and Thailand are among the
countries that undertook important steps toward liber-
alizing trade. While the trend is toward integrating
goods and capital markets, some countries have expe-
rienced pressure to increase export subsidies to miti-
gate the effects of a sustained real exchange rate
appreciation, a policy that is known to result in sub-
stantial fiscal costs and in deeper economic distor-
tions. Overall, with regard to structural policies, it
appears these should be designed so as to be consis-
tent with longer-term objectives, rather than as a
response to short-term capital inflows.
The above discussion has highlighted that the risks
associated with capital inflows create policy dilemmas.
However, the overall picture is much more positive, as
many Asian countries and a smaller number of Latin
American countries have used these inflows to finance
productive investment and achieve higher growth.
There are no policy "nicks" for managing the inflows;
the appropriate policy mix will depend on the nature of
the inflows (in particular, their reversibility), their
causes, and the macroeconomic and policy climate of
the recipient country. To reduce the probability of a
sudden reversal, policymakers must be able to maintain
a high degree of credibility and be prepared to support
clear market-oriented policies. Althou~h no single pol-
icy recipe exists for all countries, to limit some of the
risks associated with short-term flows, a reasonable
sequencing of policies would consist in initially limit-
ing the intermediation of those flows through sterilized
intervention, greater exchange rate flexibility, and/or
increased marginal reserve requirements, followed by a
gradual monetization of these flows (that is, nonsteril-
ized intervention), accompanied perhaps by an appre-
ciation of the currency. The step to nonsterilized inter-
vention can be speeded up if credit availability is
limited and/or if the quasi-fiscal costs are high and if
the implied creation of credit and money does not con-
stitute a strong force toward an acceleration of
inflation.
Last, it seems essential for countries to have flexible
policy instruments that can respond quickly to adverse
events, such as an abrupt reversal of capital flows.
Holding an adequate level of reserves and allowing for
some degree of exchange rate flexibility, possibly
through an exchange rate band or similar mechanism,
can work in this direction.
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